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I.  INTRODUCTION 
DAVID SKOVER: Consider this extraordinary narrative: A resi-
dent of a small town brings a tort action against a big corporation and 
wins a multi-million-dollar jury trial award.  While the judgment is pend-
ing on appeal to the state supreme court, one of the liberal justices known 
to often side with tort plaintiffs is up for judicial re-election.  To ensure 
the election of a new justice more sympathetic to corporate defendants, 
the corporation’s CEO pumps in an extraordinary amount of campaign 
money, both as candidate contributions and as independent political ac-
tion committee advertising expenditures.  Predictably, the newly elected 
justice casts the tie-breaking vote in favor of the corporation and reverses 
the jury trial victory. 
If this sounds like a narrative from a John Grisham novel, that is 
because it actually is.  I have summarized the plot of The Appeal, Gri-
sham’s 2008 bestseller.  When Grisham was interviewed on NBC’s To-
day Show during his promotional tour, the host, Matt Lauer, asked 
whether such a chain of events could ever realistically occur.  “It’s al-
ready happened,” Grisham answered.  “It happened a few years ago in 
West Virginia.  A guy who owned a coal company got tired of getting 
sued, and he elected his own man to the state supreme court.” 
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Reality is, indeed, stranger than fiction.  The amazing case to which 
Grisham referred is, of course, the subject of this panel’s discussion—
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal.  The case began after A.T. Massey can-
celled a long-term coal contract with Hugh Caperton and his small Har-
mon Mining Company.  A West Virginia jury found Massey liable for 
fraudulent misrepresentation and tortious interference with existing con-
tractual relations.  The jury awarded a verdict of $50 million in compen-
satory and punitive damages.  After the verdict, West Virginia held its 
2004 judicial elections.  Knowing that the state supreme court would 
likely hear an appeal in the case, Don Blankenship—the Chairman, CEO, 
and President of Massey Coal—took action to ensure a win for a candi-
date who would reverse the decision.  He spent lavishly in order to help 
unseat the incumbent, Democrat Justice Warren McGraw, in his re-
election campaign against a Republican Charleston lawyer, Brent Ben-
jamin.  Not only did Blankenship contribute the $1,000 statutory maxi-
mum to Benjamin’s campaign committee, but he also spent $500,000 in 
independent expenditures for direct mailings and letters soliciting dona-
tions and for television and newspaper advertising.  He further donated 
almost $2.5 million to a political organization called “And for the Sake 
of the Kids” that opposed McGraw and supported Benjamin. 
To put this financial flood into perspective, Blankenship’s $3 mil-
lion in contributions and expenditures exceeded the total amount spent 
by all other Benjamin supporters and was three times the amount spent 
by Benjamin’s own campaign committee.  Moreover, Caperton claimed 
that Blankenship spent $1 million more than the total amount disbursed 
by the campaign committees of both candidates combined.  When all was 
said and done, Brent Benjamin defeated the incumbent, Warren 
McGraw, by fewer than 50,000 votes. 
Before Massey filed its appeal, Caperton moved to disqualify now-
Justice Benjamin under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the federal Constitution and under West Virginia’s Code 
of Judicial Conduct.  Despite the conflict caused by Blankenship’s cam-
paign involvement, Justice Benjamin refused to recuse himself.  He in-
stead found that there was “no objective information to show that this 
Justice has a bias for or against any litigant, or that this Justice will be 
anything but fair and impartial.” 
When the appeal was filed and the West Virginia Supreme Court 
granted review, the court reversed the $50 million verdict by a vote of 
three to two, with Justice Benjamin in the majority.  During a rehearing 
process, Benjamin, then-acting chief justice, refused twice more to re-
cuse himself, and the court once again reversed the jury verdict by 
another three-to-two vote. 
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When the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed Caperton’s Fourteenth 
Amendment challenge to the West Virginia court’s judgment, it was also 
narrowly divided in its opinion.  Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion 
of the Court and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and 
Breyer in finding that, given all of the circumstances of the case, due 
process required the recusal of Justice Benjamin.  The majority declared 
that the Due Process Clause requires neither proof that Blankenship’s 
contributions were a necessary and sufficient cause of Justice Benjamin’s 
victory nor proof of actual bias calling for Benjamin’s recusal.  Rather, 
the appropriate inquiry was whether, under the totality of the facts, there 
was such a risk of bias or prejudgment that the guarantees of due process 
were compromised.   
The Court found that, in the context of a judicial election decided 
by fewer than 50,000 votes, Blankenship’s campaign contributions had a 
significant and disproportionate influence on the outcome.  The risk that 
this influence engendered actual bias was sufficiently substantial that, in 
the words of Justice Kennedy, it “must be forbidden if the guarantee of 
due process is to be adequately implemented.” 
In dissent, Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito, attacked the majority’s probability of bias standard for failing 
to provide clear, workable guidance for lower federal courts in future 
cases.  Roberts’ opinion is remarkable—the first of its kind, to the best of 
this constitutionalist’s knowledge.  The Chief Justice posed forty ques-
tions, most with sub-questions, that federal trial and appellate courts 
might now have to confront in enforcing the Due Process Clause to guar-
antee that justice is not for sale in state court systems. 
This is the first national conference to focus on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Caperton v. Massey.  This panel will review both the 
state judicial election trends and the treatment of recusal up to Caperton, 
and it will also provide different perspectives on the Court’s analysis in 
its decision.  Subsequently, the following panel will examine possible 
avenues for judicial reform to be undertaken by legislatures and courts in 
light of Caperton. 
II.  THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
BERT BRANDENBURG:  Caperton sounds extreme, but the fact 
pattern is the logical, predictable result of a new politics in judicial elec-
tions that has spiraled forward in the last decade.  The issue now is 
whether judicial elections are undergoing a radical transformation.  This 
transformation could affect how impartial our courts are at the end of the 
day, as well as whether the public has confidence in the courts’ fairness 
and impartiality.  State courts handle 98% of all litigation, and 90% of 
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America’s judges have to stand for election of one kind or another, either 
in contested races or in unopposed retention races.  Until the last decade, 
these contests have typically differed from other political elections, but 
over the last ten years, a growing tide of money and special-interest pres-
sure has flooded into judicial elections.  There seems to be a growing and 
systematic effort to make judges of all stripes—whether at the state su-
preme court level or in lower courts—more accountable to special inter-
ests and campaign trail politics, rather than to the law and the Constitu-
tion. 
This transformation is most evident in light of the sheer amount of 
money spent on recent campaigns.  Of the twenty-one states that elect 
judges in contested races, nineteen of those states have seen their fun-
draising records smashed during this past decade.  Sixty-six supreme 
court candidates have raised $1 million or more—nearly triple the num-
ber of candidates who raised that amount in previous decades.  Since 
1999, supreme court candidates have raised more than $200 million for 
supreme court elections.  This dwarfs the amount raised in the previous 
decade.  Locally, in Washington State, supreme court candidates have 
raised almost $5.3 million in the last decade. 
The last decade also ushered in the rise of the super-spenders.  In 
the states with the five most expensive elections, 58% of the total elec-
tion campaign was financed by twenty-five organizations in support of 
their candidates.  The remaining 42% was financed by 9,000 other con-
tributors.  The differential between 9,000 and twenty-five contributors is 
huge, and the money primarily comes from the national tort wars that 
have been raging around the country in various guises.  Because of this, 
much of the financing on the business side comes from groups, while the 
financing on the trial attorneys’ side comes from individual checks. 
The rise in television advertising has been another striking pheno-
menon in this new politics of judicial elections.  Although television ad-
vertisements used to be fairly unusual, they are now the norm.  In the 
year 2000, about 20% of states used television advertising for their high 
court contested elections, but by 2006, 91% of states used television ad-
vertising.  The use of television advertising functions as the canary in the 
coal mine: if these advertisements show up, they are typically signs that 
the rest of the election is going to be nasty and noisy.  The advertise-
ments typically portray courts as dark fantasy worlds populated by 
abused children, fearsome rapists, malevolent corporations, greedy law-
yers, and judges who apparently spend all their time trying to hurt ordi-
nary Americans.  Frightening horror-movie music was playing behind 
the narrator in a Wisconsin ad: 
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Michael Gableman has committed his life to locking up criminals to 
keep families safe, putting child molesters behind bars for over 100 
years.  Louis Butler worked to put criminals on the street, like Reu-
ben Lee Mitchell, who raped an 11-year-old girl with learning dis-
abilities.  Butler found a loophole.  Mitchell went on to molest 
another child.  Can Wisconsin families feel safe with Louis Butler 
on the Supreme Court? 
Justice Butler lost.  He was the first incumbent to lose in Wisconsin in 
quite a while.  Unfortunately, Justice Butler is not the only casualty of 
smear campaigns.  Other justices have also been unseated through lies 
propagated by television advertising. 
The rise in hot-button questionnaires is another ancillary item that 
has followed from this new politics.  As the elections have grown hotter, 
more interest groups have sent forward pushy questionnaires that de-
mand judicial candidates to take positions in advance in order to lock 
them in before they hear a case.  Additionally, the fact that judicial elec-
tions typically have low turnouts makes them especially tempting for an 
interest group to try to dominate.  For example, in 2006, twenty-six expe-
rienced Republican judges were swept out in Dallas County, Texas, en-
tirely because of party election trends and not because of their qualifica-
tions. 
When ordinary citizens see these trends, it affects what they think 
and fear about the courts.  Seventy-six percent of Americans believe that 
these campaign contributions influence judges’ decisions in the cour-
troom.  Seventy-nine percent of business leaders agree with this state-
ment.  The most chilling may be a poll from the National Center for State 
Courts, which was the largest poll ever conducted of state court judges in 
America.  Almost half agreed that campaign dollars affect judges’ deci-
sions.  When a group self-identifies that half of its own members are en-
gaging in money-inspired justice, it is very indicative of how the politics 
of judicial elections are changing. 
In terms of what Caperton might mean, the majority’s approach 
was limited on its face, and many commentators have suggested that 
those limitations will define how the case is interpreted in the future.  
Caperton was an extreme case, and as Justice Kennedy wrote, “Our deci-
sion today addresses an extraordinary situation where the Constitution 
requires recusal.  Not every campaign contribution by a litigant or attor-
ney creates a probability of bias that requires recusal, but this is an ex-
ceptional case.” 
However, other clues foreshadow the potential expandability of 
Caperton, even if a similar case were to come before the federal courts in 
a less-extreme form.  For example, some of the criteria laid out by Ca-
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perton are not necessarily hard to reach.  The Court enumerated a six-
point test: a person with a personal stake in a particular case and a signif-
icant and disproportionate influence placing the judge on the case by 
raising funds or directing the judge’s election campaign when the case 
was pending or imminent.  Some of these criteria are not so far-fetched 
as to be met by only the fact pattern in West Virginia.  Instances of this 
type of behavior are becoming more common with this new politics of 
judicial elections. 
In Caperton, the majority held that the inquiry centers on the con-
tribution’s relative size in comparison to the total amount of money con-
tributed to the campaign, the total amount spent on the election, and the 
apparent effect such contribution had on the outcome of the election.  
The inquiry centers only on these factors, but this is not an exclusive list.  
These criteria are not confined in a straightjacket, and the Caperton deci-
sion is not as narrow as it has been portrayed. 
As new problems have emerged that were not discussed at common 
law, the Court has identified additional instances that would require re-
cusal as an objective matter.  Although the money Blankenship paid was 
not a bribe or a criminal influence, Justice Benjamin would nevertheless 
feel a debt of gratitude to Blankenship for his extraordinary efforts to get 
him elected.  Finally, the majority notes that due process requires an ob-
jective inquiry into whether the contributor’s influence on the election or 
all the circumstances “would offer a possible temptation to the average 
judge to lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true.” 
These are examples that could recur.  Since Caperton, three differ-
ent trends have already emerged that could influence the federal courts as 
they look at other possible recusal decisions. 
First, the initial predictions were that this decision will lead to a 
flood of recusal motions.  That has not happened, but if the states were to 
impose their own recusal mechanisms, the states would preemptively 
screen most of the potential recusals before those cases make it to court.  
Second, the fact that judicial elections are changing is a fact that the 
Court will continue to note.  Finally, the Citizens United case could lead 
to a huge increase in corporate and union money flooding into elections.  
Judicial elections are supposed to be different, and the court system is 
supposed to be different from other branches.  The courts cannot help but 
notice this influx of money, but the more money that comes in, the great-
er the chance that federal courts will require recusal further down the 
road.  In the end, the future of Caperton will be a question of culture 
shift.  The circumstances of judicial elections are changing; therefore, the 
way we look at them and the way we regulate them needs to be different 
as well. 
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III.  CAPERTON: AN ORDINARY AND PREDICTABLE DECISION 
ANDREW SIEGEL: I want to take a somewhat paradoxical pers-
pective today.  Notwithstanding the judicial reform advocates’ excite-
ment over the Caperton decision and the possibilities that it opens, and 
certainly notwithstanding the hyperbolic language of the dissents, I want 
to stress the ordinariness of the Caperton decision.  Given the historical 
values of the Due Process Clause and the traditional methods of doctrinal 
development in this area, Caperton was an ordinary and predictable deci-
sion, if not inevitable. 
In my remarks, I want to do three things.  First, I will provide some 
historical background on the development of the Due Process Clause, in 
particular, focusing on the way the due process guarantees were inter-
preted before the adoption of the modern distinction between procedural 
and substantive due process.  Second, I will explain how the issues in 
Caperton fit into the larger picture of due process values and doctrinal 
development.  Finally, I will briefly discuss and evaluate the various opi-
nions in Caperton more specifically. 
To begin, the due process guarantees in this country evolved out of 
English law: the colonists and the early National Americans borrowed 
England’s constitutional provision that prevented the government from 
depriving individuals of liberty or property without due process of law, 
which was more commonly referred to as the requirement that the gov-
ernment not deprive them except according to the law of the land.  The 
early Americans put some variation of one of these phrases into almost 
every early state constitution and charter and into the Fifth Amendment. 
However, many early American judges, lawyers, and citizens 
quickly realized that a system of natural law imposed inherent limits on 
the powers of government, and they explored different theories as to how 
and why those limits might or might not be enforceable.  Increasingly, 
though sporadically, they settled on state due process and law of the land 
clauses as the primary vehicle for “constitutionalizing” these natural law 
constraints.  As evidenced by constitutional cases, treatises, and Supreme 
Court arguments, these clauses were reframed over time.  The due 
process guarantees migrated from the criminal procedure section of state 
constitutions to the sections dealing with general rights and the structure 
of government.  Because of this migration, we can see that the early 
American lawmakers understood the importance of this right. 
By the time the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, “due process 
of law” was arguably a term of art.  In this early era, we saw a very dif-
ferent due process superstructure and a different set of doctrines than the 
ones we see today.  There was no distinction between substantive and 
procedural due process.  Instead of being separate categories, due process 
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requirements were stated as a series of free-standing prohibitions on gov-
ernment conduct, a series of postulates, or in the words of one scholar, 
paradigms.  Some of these were very general: the guarantee of notice and 
an opportunity to be heard, the guarantee of an impartial arbiter, or the 
requirement that government treat individuals equally and not adopt spe-
cial class legislation.  Some were framed more specifically: the require-
ment that government not take property from A just to transfer it to B, or 
the rule—very relevant in this case—that no one should be a judge in 
one’s own case. 
What is intriguing is that these prohibitions were meant to be illu-
strative rather than exhaustive.  Both the universe of due process post-
ulates and the application of these postulates to particular facts were 
meant to follow common law methods of interpretation.  The normative 
content of these postulates is also interesting.  The focus was on policing 
the boundaries of governmental power, and there are two related, but 
distinct, strands here.  The first focuses on the legitimacy of government 
action: in a formal sense, does government have the authority to act in 
these circumstances or in this particular way?  The second focuses on 
fairness: do the government’s particular actions violate fundamental no-
tions of fairness? 
This kind of due process analysis did not die out when we devel-
oped the modern distinction between substantive and procedural due 
process.  Instead, it coexists in a complicated, layered sort of way in the 
due process superstructure.  Many free-standing, residual due process 
claims still remain—claims that the government has violated some sepa-
rate and specific due process rule.  These most often come up in criminal 
cases—for example, the rules against entrapment, coerced confessions, 
or fabricated evidence, or the rule against unexpected and unprecedented 
judicial reinterpretation of penal statutes.  But these claims can also come 
up in civil cases—for example, the constitutional limitation on retroac-
tive litigation.  One frequently cited example is the two million Ward v. 
Monroeville cases—the very cases that the Supreme Court relied on in 
Caperton regarding judicial bias.  Sometimes the Court evaluates these 
under a fundamental fairness or “shocks the conscience” test, but at other 
times, it evaluates them through issue-specific rules and doctrines that 
are always evolving. 
The problem presented in Caperton and the broad approach that the 
Court took in this case fits neatly with the story of doctrinal evolution.  
The concern in Caperton is one that has always been at the heart of the 
due process analysis.  At a broad level, Caperton is about fundamental 
fairness and the basic legitimacy of governmental action.  More specifi-
cally, Caperton is about the requirement of an impartial arbiter, and even 
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more specifically, about the long-standing prohibition on being a judge 
in one’s own case.  The latter rule dates back to Dr. Bonham’s case in 
1610, which was one of the most famous original cases in due process.  
One scholar on the subject argued that this case was the paradigmatic due 
process case—that the prohibition against being a judge in your own case 
was the paradigm through which we interpreted due process. 
These concerns have led the Supreme Court to take special interest 
in judicial bias.  The Court downplays the number of situations in which 
it has previously found due process violations for judicial bias, but there 
are five modern cases that have pricked out the line that determines when 
judges are too self-interested, and another few cases that determine when 
judges might be too wrapped up in the case because of the contempt con-
text that is arising.  The Court carefully polices those lines.  The Court’s 
approach in Caperton was also broadly consistent with this due process 
evolution. 
The Due Process Clause is clearly being used as a backstop with 
minimal standards.  The Court is not here to enforce minimal require-
ments; instead, its decisions mark out the boundaries of legitimacy and 
the minimum standards of fairness.  As in most of the common law due 
process decisions, the Court is identifying broad areas where courts must 
remain vigilant (framed in terms of rules or postulates), and it is also 
marking out the boundaries of legitimate state conduct on a case-by-case 
basis.  This kind of cautious, evolutionary, incrementalist approach is 
very characteristic of due process evolution. 
Also, this history is a history of a doctrine that is explicitly evolu-
tionary.  The concerns of the Due Process Clause—legitimacy and fair-
ness—are timeless.  Throughout American history, we have recognized 
that any application of those concerns is going to be partial, nominal, and 
time-bound.  New circumstances raise new concerns that challenge old 
values in new ways, or to put it another way, pose new threats to timeless 
values.  Protecting against those new threats has been at the heart of the 
Due Process Clause.  Situations that combine popular judicial elections, 
modern mass media, and rising levels of expenses can be seen as posing 
the kind of new threats that the Due Process Clause might respond to. 
Finally, the opinions in Caperton itself deserve both accolades and 
condemnation.  To begin, I want to give two cheers to the majority opi-
nion.  It is workmanlike.  It is not flashy; it is consistent with most prior 
opinions in related areas.  It reads like a commonsense, common law 
opinion.  It takes a clear position.  It explains why the result in the case is 
compelled by, or fits with the operative principles in the earlier cases.  It 
does not reach out to decide other harder cases or to state rigid rules that 
might burden the Court in future cases.  And, it uses an extreme case to 
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mark out the boundaries of legitimate government action in the same 
way that we have been doing for centuries.  On the other hand, the ma-
jority’s reliance on such an extreme case deserves only two cheers, not 
three.  It has no sense of history.  It makes no effort to explain just how 
deeply embedded the decision is in due process law and in due process 
values.  And, it makes no real response to the dissent’s allegation that the 
opinion is overturning a long-standing, stable constitutional law of judi-
cial recusal.  It makes one meager attempt to link to the due process tra-
ditional prohibition against being a judge in your own case.  Justice Ken-
nedy says, “Just as no man is allowed to be a judge in his own case, simi-
lar fears of bias can arise when, without the consent of the other parties, a 
man chooses the judge in his own case.”  But this statement is never ex-
plained and is never developed.  It is never linked to the history or the 
sources that could have been used to support it or to explain why that is a 
logical extension.  The dissent takes advantage of this weakness.  When 
isolated from the rest of the historical story, it is not a restatement or a 
reformation of a fundamental due process postulate.  It appears to be yet 
another self-indulgent, rhetorical farce by Justice Kennedy.  The majority 
opinion—workmanlike in the due process tradition—could have done 
more. 
On the flip side, the dissents deserve harsh criticism.  The dissents 
are hyperbolic, over-the-top, and in places, disingenuous.  The dissents 
have two great flaws: first, although we happen to be in a nominal resting 
place as part of the evolution of the due process doctrine, the dissent 
treats this as establishing a fixed rule as to when recusal is constitutional-
ly required.  But we are at just one point in a long evolutionary process.  
It is incorrect to interpret our temporary deviation from that process as a 
deep violation of something that has been clearly established. 
This notion also reflects a second flaw: the Court has an excessive, 
almost pathological fear of common law judging.  There is a profound 
skepticism in this Court about the ability of litigation to resolve disputes 
and collectively administer justice.  The Roberts opinion reads almost 
like a caricature or parody of these two sets of concerns. 
I find Chief Justice Roberts’ list of forty questions particularly 
troubling and sophomoric.  A list such as this could be compiled for any 
general common law or constitutional rule.  You can always disaggregate 
a complex web of factors that lead to a common law or a constitutional 
ruling, tweak one of those factors, and ask if the result changes.  That is 
what future cases are for—they are intended to test the law under differ-
ent circumstances.  Chief Justice Roberts uses the example of one rela-
tively obscure situation in which the Court applied a long-standing con-
stitutional guarantee in a new context and then backtracked because of its 
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inability to administer, but he ignored the fact that there are dozens of 
counter-examples that exist.  The Court routinely announces the applica-
tion of old principles to new contexts in fairly vague terms in a fairly 
easy case, thus leaving the details to later Courts. 
Think of all the situations where this has happened: New York 
Times v. Sullivan, Baker v. Carr, Frontiero v. Richardson, Craig v. Bo-
ren, and the other early gender discrimination cases.  More recently, Dis-
trict of Columbia v. Heller followed that same track, as did some of the 
takings cases like Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.  In each 
of these cases, the dissenters could have compiled a list of questions like 
the Chief Justice did in this case. 
The flaw in the dissents is in the Justices’ distrust of common law 
judges’ ability to answer those questions.  If the Supreme Court needs to 
decide six or eight or ten Caperton cases in the next decade to mark out 
the boundaries of this new rule, that is a small price to pay in judicial 
resources to insure impartial justice in the state courts. 
IV.  BEYOND RECUSAL: CAPERTON’S FIRST AMENDMENT 
CONSIDERATIONS IN JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
RICHARD HASEN: Citing the First Amendment, the 2002 case of 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White struck down a Minnesota judi-
cial speech regulation that prevented judicial candidates from “announc-
ing” their position on certain subjects.  In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg 
lamented the majority’s approach to the First Amendment and judicial 
elections.  She said, “I do not agree with this unilocular ‘an-election-is-
an-election’ approach.  Instead, I would differentiate elections for politi-
cal offices in which the First Amendment holds full sway from elections 
designed to select those whose office it is to administer justice without 
respect to purses.” 
Justice Ginsburg lost that battle, but in the new Caperton case, she 
may have won the war.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
seemed to acknowledge that different First Amendment standards may 
apply to judicial elections than to other elections.  I will argue that this 
recognition makes Caperton an important case about regulating judicial 
elections, even more so than a specific case about judicial recusal stan-
dards. 
In my brief comments, I plan to make two points.  First, although 
Caperton deals with due process issues in the judicial context, and not 
with the First Amendment per se, its reasoning cannot be cabined to due 
process and recusal issues.  Instead, Justice Kennedy’s recognition that 
judicial elections are different could affect how courts adjudicate judicial 
candidate speech cases and any other cases related to the conduct of elec-
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tions.  Second, although the opinion itself stresses the narrow, exception-
al nature of the facts supporting a constitutional recusal requirement, Jus-
tice Kennedy’s opinion in Caperton is likely to have a broader effect 
than the narrow holding first suggests.  I will address both of these points 
in turn. 
To begin, Caperton appears to jettison the “an-election-is-an-
election” mantra in favor of the recognition that judicial elections are 
different.  This recognition comes in an indirect way and requires a bit of 
background on campaign finance jurisprudence, which is not directly the 
topic of Caperton. 
In the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court considered 
the constitutionality of a number of provisions of the 1974 Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act, which was challenged as violating the First Amend-
ment.  Roughly speaking, the Court held that limits on campaign contri-
butions were permissible because the most important First Amendment 
aspect of contributing was not the amount of the contribution, but rather 
the symbolic act of making the contribution.  Also, contributions could 
be limited because of the potential for corruption and the appearance of 
corruption when money is given to a candidate.  Elected officials and 
candidates could feel that they owe political debts to large contributors. 
In contrast to contributions to candidates, the Court also considered 
the constitutionality of limits on spending, independent of candidates.  In 
Buckley, the Court held that limits on spending, unlike contribution lim-
its, went to the core of the First Amendment.  It reasoned that such limits 
would bar anyone besides candidates, the parties, PACs, and the institu-
tional media from being able to influence the outcome of a campaign.  
Notably, the Court also said that the interest in preventing corruption 
could not justify limits on independent expenditures because such spend-
ing, being truly independent, might not lead to corruption.  For example, 
the spending might be counter-productive. 
Throughout the years, apart from the question of corporate and un-
ion spending in the Citizen’s United case, the Court has stuck to the line 
it drew regarding spending contribution.  Justice Kennedy is one of the 
Justices who has expressed a strong belief that independent spending, 
even by corporations and unions, cannot be limited by the First Amend-
ment.  This history is what makes Justice Kennedy’s decision in Caper-
ton so interesting. 
In Caperton, as you will recall, Mr. Blankenship gave then-
candidate Benjamin only $1,000, the statutory maximum.  Mr. Blanken-
ship then gave $2.5 million to an independent group (a 527 organization) 
supporting candidate Benjamin, and he spent another $500,000 on his 
own, independently supporting the candidate. 
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In the majority opinion in Caperton, Justice Kennedy elides over 
the distinction between contributions and expenditures and this history of 
campaign finance jurisprudence.  Thus, Justice Kennedy refers to the 
very large contributions “received by Justice Benjamin.”  Of course, 
aside from the $1,000, the contributions were not received by Justice 
Benjamin, even though he benefited from the independent spending.  
Justice Kennedy refers to the “debt of gratitude” that Justice Benjamin 
must have felt from these independent expenditures, an observation that 
would make perfect sense if we were writing on a clean slate—but, of 
course, we are not.  We are writing in the shadow of Buckley, which said 
that independent spending has no potential for corruption. 
Justice Kennedy must have been aware of the tension between what 
he wrote in Caperton and his usual views on campaign finance.  In his 
dissent, Chief Justice Roberts pointed out the majority’s repeated use of 
the term “contributions,” and, in one of his forty questions, he asked 
whether the recusal rules apply equally to contributions and non-
coordinated expenditures.  This shows that Justice Kennedy was aware 
of what he was doing.  Justice Roberts also noted that independent 
spending in a campaign, far from creating a debt of gratitude, could be 
counter-productive from the candidate’s viewpoint.  Again, this echoes 
the language from Buckley. 
The difference in Justice Kennedy’s views on the campaign finance 
issues is explained by the fact that this was a judicial election.  Justice 
Kennedy’s ordinary view—that the rough-and-tumble of politics should 
just play itself out with little or no financial limits—does not apply in 
judicial elections.  This is quite significant.  It is true that the immediate 
impact of this case will be on judicial recusal cases, but the broader im-
plication is that it is appropriate to treat judicial elections differently for 
First Amendment purposes.  If it were not this way, the independent na-
ture of the pro-Benjamin spending should have been dispositive.  In other 
words, an election is not always just an election, at least when it is a 
judicial election. 
Justice Kennedy makes clear the reasons for the different treatment.  
Even though judges are elected, they are not supposed to be accountable 
in the way that elected officials are.  Judges are to engage in introspec-
tion by looking at text, purpose, and history, and they are to probe for a 
potential bias before deciding a case.  Justice Kennedy recognizes the 
goal of judicial objectivity and neutrality that does not apply to candi-
dates for regular office.  Therefore, if a judicial candidate feels a debt of 
gratitude to someone who engages in a large, independent expenditure 
campaign in her favor or against her opponent, the very nature of the 
judge’s job as a neutral arbiter is at stake.  In contrast, in normal elec-
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tions for office, elected officials can feel beholden to many different sup-
porters.  This is a system that promotes accountability to the people.  
This type of system makes sense for ordinary elections, but Justice Ken-
nedy’s idea raises danger signs when applied to the neutral and objective 
judiciary. 
The other special aspect of judicial elections is the low salience na-
ture of judicial campaigns.  Because most people do not pay as much 
attention to the work of judges as to the work of ordinary elected offi-
cials, voters at the ballot box are less likely to punish those who have 
benefited from large, one-sided spending. 
The first big lesson from Caperton is therefore the Court’s mostly 
implicit recognition that judicial elections are a different creature.  If that 
is so, then it is possible that the issues from Republican Party v. White 
could be reopened and other special judicial election rules could also 
withstand further constitutional challenges. 
Let me turn to the second issue: the likely effect of the Caperton 
recusal standard on judicial elections.  In a list of unanswered questions 
in his Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts includes a note about Jus-
tice Kennedy’s opinion in a 2004 case called Vieth v. Jubelirer.  In that 
case, the Court held that partisan gerrymandering cases are nonjusticia-
ble.  More specifically, the Court ruled that there are not yet any judicial-
ly manageable standards for separating partisan gerrymandering from an 
acceptable use of party information in redistricting.  The Court in that 
case actually split 4–1–4, with Justice Kennedy in the middle.  This left 
the question open for another day as to whether a judicially manageable 
standard for partisan gerrymandering could ever be created. 
Because Justice Kennedy was concerned about the unmanageability 
of the standard, his opinion left the plaintiffs without a remedy.  In his 
Caperton dissent, Chief Justice Roberts saw a similar question of unma-
nageability.  He worried about a flood of follow-up cases asking for re-
cusal and the many issues that would need to be sorted out by the lower 
courts.  Justice Kennedy does not make an extended argument for the 
manageability of the standard he sets forth in Caperton, although he did 
make the empirical prediction that Caperton motions will be rare because 
the facts will never be this extreme.  Beneath the surface, Justice Kenne-
dy seems to have made two determinations relevant on this point.  First, 
Justice Kennedy seems to have decided that the uncertainties that will 
accompany the resolution of Caperton motions are worth dealing with.  
Justice Kennedy thinks that the price of some unmanageability is worth 
paying in the context of judicial elections—a price that he was not will-
ing to pay in the context of disputes over partisan gerrymandering.  
Second, Justice Kennedy likely calculated that the vagueness of his opi-
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nion will likely have an in terrorem effect on the worst kinds of abuses in 
judicial elections.  An unclear boundary, as Rick Pildes has pointed out, 
can sometimes effectively police bad behavior.  In this case, confusion 
about what would trigger a Caperton recusal order could curb the most 
egregious campaign spending practices.  It will also encourage other in-
stitutional actors, such as state supreme courts enacting their own judicial 
codes, to fill in the gaps of Caperton with more detailed rules and proce-
dures. 
It was particularly interesting that the Chief Justice, in his Caperton 
dissent, pointed out that a 527 organization allied with the plaintiff’s bar 
spent almost $2 million in support of Justice Benjamin’s opponent in the 
West Virginia judicial race.  Will such groups continue to mount major 
campaigns for and against judicial candidates where their groups have 
regular business before the courts?  Or might this cause those who have 
been seen to have “significant and disproportionate influence on electoral 
outcomes” to scale back some of their major spending?  Spenders’ fear is 
that they might not benefit from the very people they help to elect.  In the 
end, the vagueness of the Caperton standard could be its greatest benefit. 
The decision’s vagueness might lead to minor corrections so that 
these issues do not come back to the courts.  In addition to the extent that 
the issues come to the lower courts, these courts will try various ap-
proaches to the question of recusal in line with Caperton.  These varied 
experiences can then provide valuable information to the Supreme Court, 
should it need to craft subsidiary rules to put the Caperton opinion into 
action.  Lower courts serve as scouts, providing advance information for 
the Supreme Court on what does and does not work. 
In the end, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Caperton leaves open 
many questions about the regulation of judicial elections, but that may be 
precisely the point.  Its vagueness may leave room for finally jettisoning 
the unilocular “an-election-is-an-election” approach in the judicial con-
text. 
V.  CAPERTON AS A SECOND-BEST SOLUTION 
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN: I would like to begin by disagreeing 
with Rick on his last point and agreeing with him on his first point. 
On his last point, how vague and uncertain is the Caperton deci-
sion?  The most important sentence in the decision is the one in which 
Justice Kennedy summarizes the ruling: 
There is a serious risk of actual bias—based on objective and rea-
sonable perceptions—when a person with a personal stake in a par-
ticular case had a significant and disproportionate influence in plac-
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ing the judge on the case by raising funds or directing the judge’s 
election campaign when the case was pending or imminent.1 
Note that he says “on the case,” not “on the court.”  He has given us 
a risk of bias, but he focused on a crucial distinction between biasing the 
judge with respect to issues (an interest that the Court found insufficient 
to justify limitations on judicial campaign speech in Republican Party v. 
White), and on the other hand, biasing a judge with respect to parties, 
which is certainly at the core of the broad due process concepts. 
Stated that way, the outcome in the Caperton case is clear.  Given 
all the particular facts and optics in the case, Justice Benjamin should 
have recused himself under either the West Virginia standard or the ABA 
standard.  In other words, it should have been an easy matter that did not 
have to go to a due process ruling.  In the future, it may be possible that 
we will not see a lot more Caperton-style due process cases.  Rather than 
forcing the issue into a due process case, state judicial recusal require-
ments may be tightened or enforced in such a way as to handle this at the 
state common law level or at the judicial procedural level. 
The Caperton decision is really a second-best solution to the prob-
lem of the influx of money designed to influence judges on both issues 
and cases.  It is an ex-post solution that tries to control the damage after 
the fact, rather than an ex-ante solution, which would try to prevent the 
problem from occurring in the first place.  To the extent possible, the law 
prefers ex-ante approaches that align incentives in advance to ex-post 
solutions—it is always harder to catch the horse when it is out of the barn 
or to put the toothpaste back in the tube.  Any sort of retroactive effort at 
damage control is always flawed, and the Caperton decision is no differ-
ent.  The relevant question is this: what latitude exists for trying to im-
pose more ex-ante limits on the kind of judge-buying that led to the Ca-
perton recusal ruling? 
Of course, our initial instinct is to say that we cannot impose these 
types of limits because we have a structure of campaign finance law al-
ready established.  The existing structure stems from Buckley v. Valeo, 
which limits the supply of political money while leaving the demand un-
touched.  We can have contribution limitations consistent with the First 
Amendment, but we cannot have expenditure limitations consistent with 
the First Amendment, including limitations on independent expenditures 
made in support of or in opposition to a candidate.  Although I strongly 
support First Amendment limits on expenditure limitations in the politi-
cal campaign context, there is no reason to think that such limits apply 
exactly the same way in the judicial election context.  There are objec-
                                                
 1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2263 (2009). 
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tions to this argument, but the Court held in Republican Party v. White 
that the First Amendment prevents any effort to limit campaign speech in 
judicial election campaigns. 
I would like to suggest that Republican Party v. White is a very nar-
row decision.  It imposes very narrow, common law-like limits on par-
ticular outlier restrictions that limit judicial campaign speech, and it ab-
solutely does not impose First Amendment barriers to an ex-ante solution 
to the problem. 
There are specific things that White did and did not do.  White 
struck down a rule that barred a judicial candidate from announcing 
views on disputed political or legal topics in a campaign, a rule embraced 
by only a handful of outlier states at the time.  The First Amendment is-
sues in the case made the rule easy to strike down, but White pointedly 
did not do a number of things.  First of all, in the majority opinion, Jus-
tice Scalia wrote, “We explicitly are not requiring judicial campaigns to 
sound the same way as legislative campaigns.”  He specifically noted 
also that a justification for preventing bias toward parties was not impli-
cated here.  White espoused the “no announce” rule, but the concern that 
led to this rule was that judges would talk about issues.  Because Justice 
Scalia wrote that this is not about bias toward a party, it does not seem to 
pertain to the issues presented in Caperton. 
Second, White does not imply any limits on incumbent judges’ 
speech.  It applies to candidate speech in a campaign, but not to an in-
cumbent judge who is already bound by rules of judicial conduct. 
Third, White does not speak to limitations on contributions to or 
expenditures by supporters or opponents of judicial candidates.  Al-
though this leaves intact the default world of the Buckley system, as 
stated earlier, judicial elections might be different from the political elec-
tions at issue in Buckley. 
Fourth, White does not cover restrictions on judges’ conduct, as it 
does their speech.  A host of regulations governing judicial candidates’ 
conduct during campaigns is unaffected by any First Amendment limita-
tion on what the judges themselves may say.  Because there are so many 
regulations that White does not address, the lower courts that have inter-
preted White broadly have gotten White wrong. 
The deeper reason that lower courts have misinterpreted White is 
that they ignore the countervailing constitutional interests that are impli-
cated by limiting the expenditure or contribution of funds and the use of 
those funds in judicial campaigns.  There are three major countervailing 
constitutional interests.  The first is the rule of law.  Beyond an individu-
al litigant’s interest in impartiality, there is a general systemic interest in 
having an impartial judiciary that is deeply rooted in our system.  The 
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second is the separation of powers.  The impartiality of judges is partly 
an idea that one branch should not overbear the others.  The final coun-
tervailing interest is the individual litigant’s interest in due process.  
Nothing in White ruled out the possibility that these countervailing con-
stitutional interests could trump the free speech interests in any particular 
case. 
There are other cases in other contexts in which the Court has held 
that countervailing constitutional interests are sufficiently compelling to 
outbalance First Amendment interests.  Take, for example, the Hatch Act 
Cases.  The Hatch Act Cases involved First Amendment challenges to 
rules at both the federal and the state levels.  Essentially, the Hatch Act 
said that if an individual is working as a public servant or an officer of 
the government, then that person’s electioneering activity must be li-
mited within the workplace.  The Act governed everything down to but-
tons and bumper stickers in order to keep government workers from 
pressuring their colleagues into contributing to a political campaign.  
This is an obvious limitation on political speech, and the Act would be 
overbroad by normal First Amendment rules.  Yet the Court unceremo-
niously upheld it in 1947 and again in 1973 on the grounds that the inter-
est in the impartial execution of the law overwhelmed the First Amend-
ment interest.  The Court reasoned that no one working in the executive 
branch of government should be overborne by political pressure from his 
fellow employees.  Here, the notion that impartial administration in the 
judicial branch can overwhelm any speech interest is at least parallel to 
the Hatch Act Cases. 
In a second example, the Court in Burson v. Freeman upheld a re-
striction on political signs wielded in the immediate vicinity of a polling 
place.  This would have been obviously invalid as subject-matter-based 
restriction on speech if we were in any context other than an election, but 
Justice Kennedy joined an opinion that upheld the restriction.  According 
to Justice Kennedy, there is a compelling interest in protecting the fair-
ness and integrity of the political process by prohibiting signage outside 
of the polling place. 
These cases remind us that, when it comes to elections generally, 
we have tolerated limitations on freedom of speech to ensure the fairness 
of the election process.  Judicial elections in particular have a special due 
process component of a compelling state interest.  Thus, because the 
countervailing interests in judicial elections are of a constitutional weight 
themselves, some limitation on speech is justified. 
Overall, nothing in Republican Party v. White necessarily imposes 
the Buckley framework on ex-ante regulation of judicial campaign 
speech outside the narrow context in which White held that “no an-
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nounce” rules were invalid.  Nothing in White limits us to Buckley.  
Nothing in White imposes broad First Amendment limitations. 
Since this means that there is no absolute First Amendment bar at 
the threshold, why might we prefer ex-ante regulation of independent 
expenditures of Mr. Blankenship’s kind to ex-post regulation of the kind 
imposed in Caperton?  Apart from a general preference for preventive 
measures rather than damage control, I will offer three reasons why ex 
ante is better than ex post as a way to regulate expenditures in judicial 
elections. 
First, ex-ante regulation eliminates the burden on judges to do the 
line drawing that is imposed by Caperton.  The line for when recusal is 
required, although easy to spot in the Caperton fact pattern, becomes 
more difficult to discern when we move away from the epicenter of this 
case.  Retroactive regulation is also is harmful to courts because it dis-
rupts the cohesiveness of the court itself.  For example, in reference to 
Justice Sotomayor’s arrival to the Supreme Court, Justice Thomas said, 
“We’re a family, and when a new family member comes, it changes the 
dynamic.”  By multiplying recusals and constantly bringing up substitute 
judges from the lower appellate courts to sit in, the very notion of the 
sitting court’s “repeat player” quality is damaged.  The ex-ante approach 
therefore eliminates the burden on judges to determine where the line for 
recusal is drawn and minimizes the disruption of the ongoing nature of 
the court en banc. 
Second, an ex-ante approach is best if we were to try to limit the 
use of independent expenditures to elect judicial candidates.  Indepen-
dent expenditures often come from organization with names like “Fair” 
or “And for the Sake of the Children,” but it is never clear who heads the 
organization or how the organization is tied to a judicial candidate.  In-
stead of directing the money into these unaccountable, tertiary organiza-
tions, money should be redirected into the candidate’s campaign.  This 
way, the candidate would be accountable to the voters, which benefits 
the democratic impulse that leads us to elect judges in the first place.  If 
the judicial candidate is held accountable for his or her campaign, the 
nature of the campaign and the campaign’s ads may change for the bet-
ter.  Ex-ante regulation would move campaign money from unaccounta-
ble, tertiary organizations to the accountable candidate’s campaign. 
Finally, an ex-ante method of regulation is preferable to an ex-post 
method because the ex-ante approach would influence the conduct of 
judicial campaigns even when the money is spent on behalf of losers.  In 
other words, recusal operates only on the judge who wins the election, 
but the money flowing into the campaigns (even for an unsuccessful 
candidate) is going to change the election: it creates an arms race in 
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which the other side has to ratchet up its contributions from independent 
organizations, and it alters the character of the election and the focus on 
the issues at stake. 
Overall, it seems as though the Court preserved the distinction be-
tween judicial and legislative elections in both White and Caperton.  In 
the wake of Caperton, I hope that future reform efforts will focus on try-
ing to prevent the problem that led to the recusal, rather than counting on 
the recusal to close the barn door after the horse has left. 
 
